The Intellectual Intuition of Hegel\u27s Psychology by Schwartz, Daniel
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy
8-7-2018
The Intellectual Intuition of Hegel's Psychology
Daniel Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schwartz, Daniel, "The Intellectual Intuition of Hegel's Psychology." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2018.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/245
  
 THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY  
 
 
by 
 
 
DANIEL SCHWARTZ 
 
 
Under the Direction of Sebastian Rand, PhD and Gregory Moore, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
I argue that Hegel appeals to the idea of an “intellectual intuition” in his Encyclopedia 
Psychology and that this appeal has important ramifications for the received view of Hegel’s 
mature philosophy. Hegel did not, in my view, break with Schelling over intellectual intuition in 
as decisive a way as has been claimed. Establishing this greater continuity between Hegel and 
Schelling will, I hope, bolster a minority opinion in the literature and highlight a critical yet 
underappreciated aspect of Hegel’s philosophical method. To wit, Hegel was a consummate 
reviser and, as his dealings with intellectual intuition demonstrate, revamped rather than rejected 
certain of his predecessors’ doctrines.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Intellectual intuition, Hegel, Schelling, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of 
Subjective Spirit, Theoretical intelligence 
  
THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
DANIEL SCHWARTZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
2018 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Daniel Joseph Schwartz 
2018  
  
THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
by 
 
 
DANIEL SCHWARTZ 
 
 
Committee Chair:  Sebastian Rand and Gregory Moore 
 
Committee: Eric Wilson 
 
 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
August 2018 
iv 
 
  
DEDICATION 
 
To my parents, Mark and Ellen Schwartz, who never, even for a second, asked me “what I 
was going to do with that.”
v 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am deeply grateful to Sebastian Rand and Gregory Moore for their helpful comments and 
suggestions on earlier drafts of this thesis. I am also indebted to Eric Wilson who gave me much-
needed feedback at my defense.
vi 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... v 
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
2 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 9 
2.1 When in Jena Do as Schelling Does .......................................................................... 9 
2.2 Hegel’s Psychology in the Philosophy of Mind ....................................................... 11 
3 THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY ........................ 18 
3.1 Reproductive Imagination ...................................................................................... 18 
3.1.1 Production ............................................................................................................ 19 
3.1.2 Abstraction ........................................................................................................... 21 
3.2 Associative Imagination .......................................................................................... 22 
3.2.1 Production ............................................................................................................ 23 
3.2.2 Abstraction ........................................................................................................... 24 
3.3 Creative Imagination .............................................................................................. 25 
3.3.1 Production ............................................................................................................ 26 
3.3.2 Abstraction ........................................................................................................... 29 
3.4 Mechanical Memory................................................................................................ 30 
3.4.1 Production ............................................................................................................ 30 
3.5 Addressing an Objection: Why Here? Why Now? ................................................ 38 
4 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 43 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 44 
1 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
There are few orthodoxies in the world of Hegel studies. That Hegel came to reject 
“intellectual intuition” (intellektuelle Anschauung) as a faculty of knowledge—is not quite an 
orthodoxy, but it is a popular view among Hegel scholars. Kenneth Westphal is one such scholar, 
a prominent one, who has defended this view in several spirited articles of late.1 Can Westphal’s 
view of Hegel, and that of so many of his colleagues, be resisted? It will come as no surprise 
(especially to those familiar with tired academic foreshadowing) that I think we can and should 
resist this view of Hegel. More surprising is the fact that Westphal himself provides a clue as to 
how such resistance might be mounted. 
Westphal writes that if Hegel were truly attached to intellectual intuition, he would use 
“intuition as a cognitive medium” so that we can “know positively what role this alleged medium 
plays in Hegel’s epistemology” (2007, 113). Intellectual intuition, the idea of a mind that can 
produce the intuitions it thinks, was a hot topic in Hegel’s day, not least because Hegel loudly (and 
trenchantly) criticized it as a model for how humans could acquire knowledge. Hence Westphal’s 
opposition to the idea that intellectual intuition played a role in Hegel’s mature philosophy. Yet in 
the same essay that Westphal insists on Hegel’s rejection of intellectual intuition, the essay quoted 
above, Westphal nevertheless specifies where such an intuition would have to be found, if indeed 
it could be found, in Hegel’s mature thought. Hegel’s account of “theoretical intelligence” 
(theoretischer Geist [Intelligenz]), sections §§440-468 of his Philosophy of Mind—this is where 
Westphal tells us we must search even while he is convinced we search in vain (114).2 And why? 
                                               
1 For instance: “Does Kant’s Opus Postumum Anticipate Hegel’s Absolute Idealism?” 2009; “Intelligenz and the 
Interpretation of Hegel’s Idealism: Some Hermeneutic Pointers,” 2007; “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of the Intuitive 
Intellect,” In Sedgwick, The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, 2000. 
2 Numbers preceded by “§” without further bibliographic information refer to sections of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Mind: A Revised Version of the Wallace and Miller Translation. Edited by M. J. Inwood. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). I cite Hegel’s Remarks (Anmerkungen) by “A” and his Additions (Zusätze) by “Z.” My 
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Why can't we find intellectual intuition, a mind that creates its intuitions, in these otherwise 
auspicious passages of Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind? 
Because, as Westphal argues, “any intuition” in these passages “incorporates and modifies 
sensations in ways that make possible representations, which in turn make possible both names 
and classifications, all of which together makes possible . . . conceptualization proper” (ibid.). 
We’re looking for a mind that generates the intuitions it requires for “thinking,” for 
“conceptualization proper.” Yet here we have a mind that incorporates the intuitions it requires for 
“thinking.” Here, intuitions are given to the mind; the mind does not give itself intuitions. For the 
mind of these sections, then, there can be no intuitions without sensations, no representations 
without intuitions, no names without representations, and no thinking without names. There is no 
coincidence, then, between thinking an object and intuiting one because here the mind must intuit 
to think. Thus, Hegel does not appeal to intellectual intuition in his Philosophy of Mind. Such, at 
least, is Westphal’s conclusion. 
Yet it is significant, as I have noted, that while Westphal insists on the absence of 
intellectual intuition from Hegel’s mature philosophy, he nevertheless specifies where we would 
have to find this faculty. It is as if Westphal cites these passages of the Philosophy of Mind to 
anticipate the objection they might be adduced to support. But how compelling is Westphal’s 
prebuttal? Is he right to prescind intellectual intuition from these passages due to theoretical 
intelligence’s alleged dependence upon intuition? 
Certainly, Westphal is right that intuition precedes representation in the mind’s 
development. Westphal is also right that the mind must have the capacity for intuition to develop 
the capacity for representation. But there is a way in which it is as important for the mind to 
                                               
citation method for all other primary sources can be found in the “Primary Sources” section of the bibliography 
located at the end of this paper. 
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dispense with intuition as it is to have had intuition in the first place. Consider the lifecycle of a 
plant, a frequent metaphor for Hegel. Before bearing fruit, a plant develops a pistil. After 
fertilization, the pistil grows into the fruit of the plant. The fruit contains the seed of a new plant 
and the bridge to a new lifecycle. Thus, the pistil is necessary for the plant to reach maturity. Just 
as necessary, however, is the pistil’s “negation” by the fruit it becomes. A plant must develop a 
pistil to mature. But it must also dispense with its pistil to reach maturity, to bear fruit. The same 
is true of intuition in Hegel’s account of intelligence. 
Theoretical intelligence must develop a capacity for intuition to develop representation and 
thinking in turn. But at the same time, intelligence must dispense with intuition even though 
intuition is presupposed by the thinking that supplants it. In the stage at which theoretical 
intelligence can represent intuitions—the stage which Westphal identifies in order to exclude—in 
this stage the mind progressively severs its representations from their connection to and reliance 
on intuition. Indeed, this severance, whereby the mind detaches its contents from intuition, this is 
how the mind ultimately attains its freedom in thinking. The mind’s dependence on intuition, is 
then, like the pistil of the flower, crucially cast off in the process of its maturation. The mind 
eliminates intuitions it regards as other than itself so that is may be wholly at one with itself, wholly 
self-determined. How, in representation, does the mind emancipate itself from intuition and 
thereby dispense with what Westphal thinks it must presuppose? By creating what it presupposes, 
by producing the intuitions required for thought, in other words, by intellectual intuition.  
Note well, that the intellectually intuitive mind Hegel describes here is not identical to the 
intellectual intuition he so famously renounced. Hegel employs some of the same concepts and 
strategies he developed decades earlier while experimenting with the idea of “an intellectual 
intuition of nature” (intellectuelle Anschauung der Natur). But, the intellectual intuition of the 
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Philosophy of Mind is a revised version, even a radically revised version, of the intellectual 
intuition Hegel worked on earlier in his career. That, at least, is the thesis of this paper. 
Let me immediately dispatch two separate but related objections. I dispatch them here to 
help clarify what I wish to argue and why. The first objection is that mine and Westphal’s views 
of theoretical intelligence are only trivially different. I say theoretical intelligence must dispense 
with given intuitions so that the mind can give intuitions to itself in thought. Westphal says 
theoretical intelligence must derive its ability to think from intuitions the mind preserves. 
Ultimately, this difference could be said to boil down to emphasis. I see representations as 
intuitions produced by the mind—but crucially—severed from their connection to intuition. 
Westphal sees representations as intuitions modified by the mind but—just as crucially—retaining 
their connection to intuition. I focus on the created rather than derived character of representations, 
whereas Westphal focuses on their derived rather than created character. 
The second objection is that mine and Westphal’s views of intellectual intuition are only 
trivially different. I say that the intellectual intuition of Hegel’s theoretical intelligence is a radical 
revision of his earlier work on the same subject. Westphal says that Hegel abandoned his earlier 
focus on intellectual intuition and that this intuition is, therefore, absent from Hegel’s mature 
thought in general and Hegel’s discussion of theoretical intelligence in particular. Here again, one 
might suspect that the difference between “a radical revision of intellectual intuition” and “an 
absence of intellectual intuition” is more a difference of emphasis than of substance. 
Let me say by way of clarification that the point of contention in each objection—the 
relationship between representation and intuition in the first objection and the difference between 
the revision or excision of intellectual intuition in the second—that both points misrepresent what 
I wish to claim. I am not merely pointing out a loose analogy, one arguably more semantic than 
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philosophical, between an intellectual intuition of nature and a mind that thinks in the intuitions it 
creates. Indeed, the analogy runs deeper than this, as deep as some of the epistemic strategies both 
forms of intellectual intuition pursue in their quest for knowledge. To wit, both the intellectual 
intuition of Hegel’s earlier work and the intellectual intuition of his Philosophy of Mind come to 
know their object in the following way. 
A. Both create the intuitions they seek to know. 
B. Both abstract from the subjective contingencies of their created intuitions. 
C. Both ultimately realize the unity that underlies their created intuitions and themselves. 
To return to the two objections above, my argument does not turn on whether an intuition 
has been created or derived, or on whether enough of intellectual intuition persists for Hegel’s 
radically revised version to go by the same name. Rather, I try to show that what may at first seem 
like a rough parallel, between the intellectual intuition of Hegel’s youth and the theoretical 
intelligence of his maturity, deepens into a genuine philosophical debt when we consider Hegel’s 
consistent fealty to the three themes outlined above. For theoretical intelligence does indeed, as 
we shall see, develop into something that a) creates the intuitions it thinks, b) abstracts from these 
same created intuitions, and c) ultimately realizes the unity between these created intuitions and 
itself. 
Apart from putting the brakes on an accelerating trend in Hegel scholarship, what is 
significant about Hegel’s mature debt to the doctrine of intellectual intuition? First, and most 
obviously, Hegel’s debt to this doctrine revises our current view of his debt to Friedrich Schelling, 
a champion of intellectual intuition who was, at different points in Hegel’s career, a dear friend, 
an esteemed colleague, and a bitter rival. Scholars commonly attribute the rift that divided Hegel 
and Schelling to Hegel’s rejection of intellectual intuition. So, evidence of a mature (if 
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significantly revised) appeal to this doctrine on Hegel’s part would alter how we understand the 
decisiveness, at least philosophically speaking, of their breach. 
Second, and more important, Hegel’s debt to intellectual intuition hits home an often 
intoned but seldom internalized insight into Hegel’s philosophical method. To wit, Hegel was a 
consummate reviser and, as his dealings with intellectual intuition demonstrate, revamped rather 
than rejected certain of his predecessors’ doctrines. Appreciating Hegel as a philosopher of 
revision is critical to understanding his relationship to his philosophical past, and the philosophical 
past more generally. Consider the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where, once again, the 
fructifying plant is front and center. 
[T]he very attempt to define how a philosophical work is supposed to be connected with 
other efforts to deal with the same subject-matter drags in an extraneous concern, and what 
is really important for the cognition of the truth is obscured. The more conventional opinion 
gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given 
philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only 
acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as 
the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. The bud 
disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted 
by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false 
manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms 
are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually 
incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic 
unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; 
and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. But he who rejects a 
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philosophical system [i.e. the new philosopher] does not usually comprehend what he is 
doing in this way; and he who grasps the contradiction between them [i.e. the historian of 
philosophy] does not, as a general rule, know how to free it from its one-sidedness, or 
maintain it in its freedom by recognizing the reciprocally necessary moments that take 
shape as a conflict and seeming incompatibility. (1-2) 
The Phenomenology of Spirit was the first major publication of Hegel’s philosophical 
maturity, the book that launched his independence from Schelling, Hegel’s closest mentor at the 
time. It was also the book that first put Hegel and Schelling at loggerheads. Hegel criticized 
Schelling’s ideas about intellectual intuition in withering (and eminently quotable) terms. And yet, 
despite the Phenomenology’s role in the drama of Hegel and Schelling’s divergence, the preface 
to the Phenomenology presents philosophy as a realm of reconciliation. Here, Hegel recasts the 
contradictions between diverse philosophies as so many opportunities for comity, as means to a 
unified system of knowledge, a science, that Hegel dedicates his career to devising. 
If we put to the Phenomenology the question, “Does Hegel accept or reject Schelling’s 
account of intellectual intuition?” we can readily find the reply above. The Phenomenology rejects 
the question of acceptance or rejection because it is predicated on a misunderstanding of how 
philosophy progresses. Neither Hegel nor (genuine) philosophy advances by acceptance or 
rejection. Instead, both are engaged in a more nuanced, dialectical process of revision 
Bearing Hegel’s commitment to revision in mind, one sees that much of the literature on 
his reception of intellectual intuition seriously misconstrues his philosophical practice. Hegel does 
not draw or discard philosophical doctrines like so many cards in a deck. He renovates extant 
philosophical façades, usually Greek ones, doing them up in the modern style. In fact, the metaphor 
of renovation is Hegel’s. “To build a new city in a devastated land has its difficulties, even if there 
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is no lack of material at hand; but even greater are the obstacles, of a different kind, when the task 
is to give a new layout to an ancient and solidly constructed city, with established rights of 
ownership and domicile; one must also decide, among other things, not to make use of much 
otherwise valued stock” (2015, 507). Here, in the Science of Logic, the project is not so much one 
of creation as it is one of renovation. 
Aside from what it says about his philosophical method, Hegel’s commitment to revision 
also says something about Hegel’s philosophical temperament. Few people would accuse Hegel 
of modesty. And no wonder. Hegel can be final in his philosophical judgments, bold in his 
systematic ambitions, and downright audacious in his breadth. But at the same time, Hegel never 
claimed to accomplish anything so extravagant alone. And despite what people assume, he also 
never claimed to have personally brought philosophy to an end, even if he asserted that the end of 
philosophy was in sight. “The last philosophy thus contains” as Hegel is careful to note, “the 
previous ones, includes all the stages, and is the product and result of all the ones that preceded it 
. . . [O]ne must rise above . . . one’s own vanity, the notion that one has thought something special” 
(TW 20:461). To conclude, Schelling’s doctrine of intellectual intuition is a bit like one of the 
stages in Hegel’s “last philosophy.” Its legacy, as I will argue, lives on even if, in the full flowering 
of Hegel’s thought, that legacy looks different than its progenitor. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 When in Jena Do as Schelling Does 
Schelling was just twenty-three when he became a professor at the University of Jena. 
Then, in 1801, two years after his appointment, Schelling published “On the True Concept of the 
Philosophy of Nature.” Here, Schelling describes an intellectual intuition of nature as a way to 
acquire knowledge of reality. After positing ourselves as subjects, and in so doing, identifying 
ourselves as the objects of such positing, Schelling bids us abstract from ourselves entirely. For, 
in abstracting from our ourselves as knowing subjects, we can reach the true basis of reality, 
namely, the unified ground on which both supervene. The challenge of Schelling’s intellectual 
intuition lies in this abstraction from our intellectual activity. Such abstraction, an activity 
Schelling sometimes describes as “depotentiating,” requires that we reach beneath our conscious 
activity to nature in its unconscious productivity. 
The I must take the subject-object only from its own intuition (I make it non-conscious), 
but not from mine. The task is: to make the subject-object in this way objective, and to 
generate it from itself to the point where it coincides as one with nature (as product). The 
point where it becomes nature is also that where the unlimitable in it raises itself to the I 
and where the opposition between I and nature, which is made in common consciousness, 
completely disappears, so that nature = I and I = nature. (95-6) 
In abstracting from itself the I also abstracts from its object, since subject and object are 
correlatives of one another.3 Thus, the depotentiation Schelling envisions is not so much a 
suppression of the subject, but of subject as opposed to object, subject as negatively related to 
                                               
3 Schelling explains this correlation between subject and object rather crisply in his 1795 essay “Of the I as Principle 
of Philosophy.” “I call subject that which is determinable only by contrast with but also in relation to a previously 
posited object. Object is that which is determinable only in contrast with but also in relation to a subject” (1980, 75). 
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object. The I does not transcend the subject so much as the disjunction implied by subjectivity. 
Once the I neutralizes this disjunction in intellectual intuition, it can apprehend the unified ground 
of itself and its object, that ground which the diremption of subject and object presupposes, namely, 
nature. What is more, in engaging with nature as its ground, the I realizes its unity with nature; for 
the I is incarnated within it. 
Hegel also published in 1801, his first major publication, The Difference Between Fichte’s 
and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy (a.k.a. the Differenzschrift). The Differenzschrift was 
devoted, among other things, to the man who had procured Hegel his first university job, Schelling, 
who was eight years Hegel’s junior. Schelling got Hegel a modest gig as a lecturer at Jena and, 
from 1801-1803, the two collaborated closely, often publishing jointly in a journal they founded 
together. 
In the Differenzschrift, Hegel emphasizes the unified structure of nature, just as Schelling 
does in “On the True Concept.” For Hegel, though, if we are to preserve the integrity of this 
structure, we must do so with respect to both nature and the I and not, like Fichte and Schelling, 
privilege the one over the other. So, we must, like Fichte, conceive of the I as subject-object, and 
like Schelling, conceive of nature as subject-object. However, while it is necessary on the one 
hand, to separate out the composite structure of both the I and nature, it is also necessary on the 
other hand, to bring together both nature and the I as moments of a more fundamental unity, a 
unity one can abstract to in intellectual intuition. This more immanently differentiated but no less 
unified intuition of reality Hegel dubs “transcendental intuition” (transzendentale Anschauung). 
In order to grasp transcendental intuition in its purity, philosophical reflection must abstract 
from this subjective aspect so that transcendental intuition, as the foundation of philosophy, 
may be neither subjective nor objective for it, neither self-consciousness as opposed to 
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matter, nor matter as opposed to self-consciousness, but pure transcendental intuition, 
absolute identity, that is neither subjective nor objective . . . Opposition as it pertains to 
speculative reflection is no longer an object and a subject, but a subjective transcendental 
intuition and an objective transcendental intuition. The former the Ego, the latter is nature, 
and both are the highest appearances of absolute, self-intuiting Reason. 
Hegel is not more specific in the Differenzschrift about how to accomplish this abstraction 
in transcendental intuition. And given his later embrace of dialectics, one might suspect Hegel 
abandoned such an intuition altogether. Not so, as we shall see. 
2.2 Hegel’s Psychology in the Philosophy of Mind 
 
In the Psychology section of his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel gives an account of cognition 
that explains how humans develop the capacity for “thought” (Denken). What follows is an 
overview of this account.4 Then, in section three, I point out elements in Hegel’s account that, in 
my view, rely on Schelling’s theory of intellectual intuition. 
Reason, for Hegel, involves the mind’s ability to lay hold of objects independent of itself. 
A mind that reasons can make true claims about what is. Humans can reason because the objects 
humans reason about are rationally constituted in the way the human mind is. In the Psychology, 
the developing mind exerts progressively more control over its objects and in so doing understands, 
and ultimately demonstrates, the above truth: that the objects of reality are intelligible to the mind 
because reality is identical to the mind—reality is rational.5 
                                               
4 For a more extensive overview of Hegel’s Psychology see Lucia Ziglioli’s helpful account in Ziglioli, “World of 
Representation and Thought: Hegel on Subjective Knowing,” 2016. 
5 See, for example, how Hegel puts this point in the Encyclopedia Logic. “To say that there is understanding, or 
reason, in the world is exactly what is contained in the expression ‘objective thought’” (1991, §24 A). 
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Besides accounting for how the mind can have knowledge, this compatibility between the 
mind and its objects also accounts for how the mind can be self-determining. Reasoning is a way 
for the mind to determine itself, to liberate itself from confronting something other. If the mind is 
only free when it is self-determined, then the mind may not be determined by an object, a thing 
that it regards as other. Thus, at the culmination of the mind’s reasoning, in thinking, the mind’s 
realized compatibility with its object is at the same time the mind’s liberation from its object’s 
otherness. It is then important to remember that Hegel invokes both knowledge and freedom in his 
Psychology because both are at stake. 
Hegel begins his account of a mind gaining control over itself and its objects, by explaining 
how “intelligence” (Intelligenz) emerges from and incorporates two earlier forms of mind, that of 
“soul” (Seele) and “consciousness” (Bewußtsein) (§440). As the culmination of these forms, mind 
relates to objects both as determinations of itself (soul) and as determinations of something other 
than itself (consciousness). In comprehending both these relations, the mind realizes its 
constitutive role in its experience of objects and thereby emerges as intelligence. That the mind 
distinguishes between itself and its objects, and must do so to experience objects as such, indicates 
for intelligence the broader freedom it exercises in its activity. 
After characterizing intelligence accordingly, Hegel proceeds to describe the stages 
intelligence progresses through en route to thinking. The first stage, “intuition” (Anschauung), 
shows intelligence that certain of its perceptions refer to objects outside itself. In intuition, 
intelligence direct its “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit) to objects in time and space and thereby 
differentiates these objects from its subjectivity (§448). Because intelligence must attend to objects 
to intuit them, intelligence regards its intuition of objects as entirely self-wrought. Yet in intuiting 
objects, the mind finds objects to be self-standing, and therefore determinative of intuitions 
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intelligence formerly considered self-determined. The objects of intuition must, therefore, be 
further incorporated into the mind for intelligence to determine its intuitions genuinely. In other 
words, intelligence must “inwardize” its intuitions. 
Thus, the next step in intelligence’s increasing determination of itself and its intuitions 
involves the inwardization of intuition through “representation” (Vorstellung). Intelligence 
initially encounters representations in its “recollection” (Erinnerung) of past intuitions. When 
intelligence comes across an intuition it has had before, it refers this intuition to a past 
representation of it stored in the mind (§454). This type of mental representation, what Hegel calls 
an “image” (Bild), helps intelligence inwardize its intuitions by importing mental copies of them 
into the “space and time” of the mind (§452). When intelligence then encounters an intuition it 
recollects, it can regard this intuition as its own, as one it already possesses in its store of images 
(§454). 
Also important for the greater control intelligence exerts over itself, and its intuitions is the 
recollected image’s abstraction from the intuitable manifold it represents. The image retains a 
portion of the perceptual content experienced in intuition, not the full range of content originally 
intuited (§452). The abstract image is, in this way, isolated from the immediate context that gave 
rise to it. It is now separable from the full range of contingencies (time, place, etc.) that produced 
the intuition it represents. Yet despite the image’s contextual independence from intuition, the type 
of intuition that initially produced the image is still necessary for intelligence to recollect the 
image. Intelligence cannot summon images at will. This changes in the first phase of “imagination” 
(Einbildungskraft), where intelligence can recall images of intuitions without those intuitions 
present. Here, in “reproductive imagination,” intelligence extends its mastery of intuition in being 
able to represent instances of intuition without requiring such instances to do so (§457). 
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In “associative imagination,” (Associirende) intelligence organizes its images under more 
universal images of its design (§456). So, intelligence might group the images of two conifers by 
identifying what they have in common and making this commonality the universal under which it 
subsumes both. This organization of images under universal images eventually yields still more 
universal images—more universal in their further abstraction from the wider range of particulars 
they comprehend (§455). The universal image of a conifer eliminates the varying determinations 
of all individual conifers, while the universal image of a tree eliminates the even more varying 
determinations of all individual trees. Now that intelligence incorporates both particular images 
(such-and-such conifer) and the general categories under which it organizes these images (conifers 
simpliciter), intelligence possesses intuitions in both their universal and particular moments. 
This unity of universal and particular in intelligence signals the emergence of the “creative 
imagination” (Phantasie), the third and final phase of imagination’s development. Here, 
intelligence encounters an image as known (i.e., categorized under a universal), and as existent 
(i.e., instantiated in a particular image). Both knowledge of the image and the image itself are now 
within intelligence. Creative imagination is, in this unity of the two, self-contained or self-
identical; it need not go beyond itself for its cognitions (§457). Yet because intelligence is self-
contained in this manner, it has no way to confirm the veridicality of its images. Intelligence must, 
therefore, instantiate its ideas externally so that other subjects may verify them. Intelligence 
accomplishes this by creating “signs” (Zeichen) (§457). 
Signs are physical things intelligence produces to refer to its internal images. And once 
again, the sign-making capacity of intelligence allows the mind greater control over its intuition 
of objects. This control is evident in the mind’s ability to make its internal images manifest to 
external intuition (§457 A). Also significant, is the way the mind produces such manifestations. In 
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linking a specific intuition to a specific mental image, intelligence severs the links this intuition 
naturally has to other mental images. In using an asterisk to signify a footnote, I disregard 
everything the asterisk’s intuitable form connotes: a star for instance. What is more, because the 
intuitable form of the sign (*) does not resemble the signified representation (the footnote), because 
the signifier is arbitrary, intelligence has free range in choosing what intuition it will use to signify 
the representation it has in mind (§458 A). Intelligence can equally use the word “conifer” or 
“Nadelbaum” to refer to its image of certain trees. 
But, for the sign intelligence uses to be used and verified by other minds, intelligence must 
sustain the link it establishes between sign and image. It must remember that the word “conifer” 
means conifer so that is can use the word repeatedly and consistently, and so that it can recognize 
when other minds do the same. Thus, the signs intelligence initially established externally it now 
retains in “memory” (Gedächtnis), memory in its first phase of development, namely, “retentive 
memory.” 
Then, in “reproductive memory,” the memorized signs now internal to mind are called 
“names” (Namen) (§462). Here, intelligence abstracts from the intuitable qualities of the singular 
name it inwardizes. So, in its inwardization of a name intelligence might leave out, for instance, 
certain sounds peculiar to particular utterances of the name in question. Yet at the same time, 
intelligence retains those sounds necessary for identifying that name in the future. Intelligence 
memorizes the name as universal and thereby retains the general form of the name by which 
particular instances of it can be identified (§461). 
Once intelligence permanently links the name “conifer” to its image of one it no longer 
needs the image it has relied on so far. The name “conifer,” even without the image it refers to, is 
enough for intelligence to consider the type of tree in question. Intelligence, therefore, has 
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increased control over intuition in that it can dispense with intuition without also dispensing with 
its cognition of objects. In the name, intelligence deals with something that initially appeared to it 
in external intuition as an object, as a sign. Yet this object, the sign now represented in intelligence 
by a name, is one intelligence produced (§462). 
In “mechanical memory,” (mechanishce) the third and final phase of memory’s 
development, the mind abstracts from intuition entirely, that is, from the intuitable contents still 
associated with names (§463). The mind does this because intuition, even as semiotically linked 
to names, is still subjectively conditioned. The circumstances (historical, cultural, physiological, 
etc.) I encounter conifers in condition my intuition of what a conifer is. Thus, in mechanical 
memory, the name “conifer” remains but what “conifer” signifies does not. In this way, the names 
of the mind are meaningless (§463). Collectively, however, these names are meaningful; they are 
the set of names memorized by intelligence and, as such, conform to the order intelligence imposes 
upon them. Intelligence’s memory is “mechanical” in that the order it arranges its names in is 
exogenous to the names themselves. Because they are individually meaningless, names have no 
internal connection to one another. Their only connection is the one intelligence confers upon 
them: they are all names of this intelligence (§463). 
By being meaningful for intelligence but meaningless in themselves, the names of 
mechanical memory represent the final step in mind’s subjective development, the step in which 
mind becomes objective and can think. The names intelligence makes sense of are, in themselves, 
“senseless” (sinnlos), that is, utterly other than, and indifferent to, their intelligible order (§463). 
Thus, meaningless names are, in their otherness, objective for the meaning-making subjectivity 
that comprehends them. Names are the object of intelligence. In mechanical memory, the mind 
reconciles subject and object. For, subject (intelligence) and object (names) emerge as immanently 
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differentiated moments of a totality (mind). At the culmination of its development, then, 
intelligence exhibits consummate control over and liberation from the object it intuits by 
reconciling itself to its object’s otherness. The object is fully intelligible to the mind in being fit to 
be a component of it. 
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3 THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY 
 
“As reason its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself i.e. to universalize 
it” (§457). Such is Hegel’s summary of the first half of his Psychology, where the intelligence 
assimilates the objects it intuits. Intelligence works on its intuitions to further inwardize what 
appears to it as external. However, at a crucial juncture, the intelligence is “directed towards 
giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. In 
other words, it aims at making itself be and be a fact . . . it is self-uttering, intuition-producing: 
the imagination which creates signs” (ibid.). Intelligence’s central transition, then, is from 
appropriation to production. Intelligence “appropriate[s] the immediate datum” of intuition but 
then becomes “intuition-producing.” 
In this section, I argue that the “intuition-producing” intelligence of the Psychology is 
indebted to Hegel and Schelling’s earlier account of intellectual intuition. The intuition-producing 
intelligence is, like intellectual intuition, also thematized in terms of production, abstraction, and 
correspondence. Indeed, we shall see that as intelligence develops it: A) moves closer to producing 
its intuitions, B) abstracts more from the subjective aspects of such intuitions, and C) progressively 
realizes the correspondence between itself and its intuitions. Thus, as I shall show, the 
intelligence’s development is predicated on these three crucial moments of Schelling’s intellectual 
intuition of nature.6 
3.1 Reproductive Imagination 
The “intuition-producing” portion of the Psychology, in which the mind spontaneously 
produces its representations, begins in Hegel’s discussion of imagination. In imagination, 
                                               
6 Note, however, that intelligence is most Schellingian in its most developed state. So, although I discuss the steps 
intelligence takes toward Schelling to trace the breadth of Schelling's influence over Hegel’s account, the most vivid 
and archetypal examples of Schelling's impact occur only at the end of Hegel’s account—and only at the end of my 
discussion in turn.   
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intelligence can represent a prior intuition that it no longer intuits. So, I may call to mind the image 
of a chocolate cake even after finishing the cake in front of me. Reproductive imagination is an 
improvement over recollection in that intelligence no longer requires an occurrent intuition of the 
image it wishes to represent. In imagination, intelligence can summon images spontaneously. 
3.1.1 Production 
What does imagination have to do with intellectual intuition? If we are looking for a mind 
that creates its intuitions intellectually, then reproductive imagination will hardly suffice. This type 
of imagination represents past intuitions to itself internally in the form of mental images. It does 
not instantiate physically the content it intuits. And yet, Hegel often describes the mental images 
of reproductive imagination in ways that emphasize their objective character. So often, in fact, that 
one begins to wonder whether Hegel is indeed the obscurantist many have accused him of being. 
Consider, for instance, the transition from recollection to imagination in Hegel’s 
Psychology. In recollection, “an abstractly stored image needs, for its reality, a real intuition” 
(§454). When it has such an intuition—one that resembles the image it has stored—then 
intelligence is “aware of its initially only internal image as also an immediate image of intuition 
and as proved in intuition. The image, which in the pit of intelligence was only its property, is 
now, with the determination of externality, also in its possession” (ibid.). In other words, to 
recollect the image effected by a past intuition intelligence must encounter a subsequent intuition 
of the same kind. But, to imagine an object, intelligence need not intuit the object it represents. In 
reproductive imagination, “Intelligence is thus the power which can externalize its property and 
which no longer needs external intuition for the existence of the property in intelligence” (ibid.) 
Such is Hegel’s account of what imagination can do that recollection cannot. Imagination can 
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produce what recollection requires intuition to induce, namely, the mental representation of an 
object. 
But notice Hegel’s repeated emphasis on the objectivity of this merely mental 
representation. Rather than say, “intelligence can represent an image to itself,” he says, 
“intelligence can externalize one.” Indeed, Hegel links the ability to “externalize” with “external 
intuition” to associate what intelligence imagines with what it intuits. So, in the transition from 
recollection to imagination, we go from an intelligence that relies on external intuition to “prove” 
its merely “internal images,” to an intelligence that “no longer needs external intuition” to 
“externalize” its images into “existence.” 
Several of the Zusätze to reproductive imagination also emphasize the objectivity of 
intelligence’s representations. At first, when intelligence represents an intuition by recollecting it, 
intelligence diminishes “the clarity and freshness of the immediate individuality, the all round 
determinacy, of what is intuited; the intuition is obscured and blurred, when it becomes an image” 
(§452 Z) One way we distinguish between an intuition and an image is that an image is fainter 
than the intuition it represents. The cake you see before you is more vivid than the cake you 
recollect in your mind’s eye. But, by recollecting a mental image repeatedly, intelligence dilutes 
this distinction between image and intuition. For, “the image, by being frequently summoned up 
in this way, acquires such a great vitality and presence in me that I no longer need the external 
intuition in order to recollect it” (§454 Z). Intelligence gradually restores to the image some of the 
vividness that distinguished it from its intuition. So much so that, in imagination, intelligence can 
dispense with intuition. Of course, an intuition remains more vivid than even an imagined 
representation. But, in co-opting some of this vividness, intelligence nevertheless brings its images 
closer to the intuitions they represent. 
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Hegel’s consistent blurring of the boundaries between internal representation and external 
intuition is not the product of obscurantism on his part, nor is it an accident of his admittedly wooly 
style. It is an early indication Hegel gives us that he is working toward a mind modeled on the idea 
of intellectual intuition, a mind that can reconcile itself to its object by producing what is objective 
for it. Thus, Hegel notes the incipient objectivity of what are still subjective representations to flag 
the ultimate objectivity of what intelligence works on itself to produce. What may seem like the 
blurring of boundaries is then the building of a bridge, a bridge constructed by intelligence to span 
the gap intellectual intuition had been contrived to close, namely, the gap between subject and 
object. In sum, Hegel’s focus on the creative aspect of imagination, but also as we shall see on the 
creative aspect of Representation as a whole, is akin to the same focus in intellectual intuition. For 
the critical point in both cases is to see how a subject creates its object. 
3.1.2 Abstraction 
In reproductive imagination, intelligence can produce an image abstracted from many of 
the empirical circumstances in which intelligence originally intuited it. When I imagine a chocolate 
cake, it need not have all the properties of the chocolate cakes I have intuited previously. Instead, 
the chocolate cake I imagine may have only some of the properties common to some of my prior 
intuitions of chocolate cake. I can, for instance, picture a chocolate cake with brown frosting but 
without the sprinkles decorating my chocolate cake of most recent memory, the one I had for 
dessert. Thus, though various empirical circumstances condition particular intuitions, intelligence 
may abstract from these circumstances and thereby imagine a universal representation. The 
imaginary cake with the brown frosting is universal—both in resembling all chocolate cakes and 
in not resembling, exactly, any one chocolate cake in particular. Also more universal are the 
circumstances in which intelligence can imagine. Intelligence need not, as in recollection, intuit a 
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cake to imagine one. Thus, through abstraction, intelligence liberates its mental activity (its 
imagining) and its mental representations (its imaginings) from some of the empirical conditions 
to which it is bound in intuition. 
What does this abstraction have to do with intellectual intuition? Intelligence’s capacity for 
abstraction contributes to its development of objective thinking. To think objectively intelligence 
must abstract from the empirical contingencies of its intuitions. It must apprehend objects as they 
are essentially and not as it happens to intuit them.7 The same is true of intellectual intuition. As 
we saw in “On the True Concept,” Schelling urges us to abstract from everything subjective so 
that we can focus on what is neither subjective nor objective, namely, nature—nature before it is 
mediated through an experiencing subject. Abstracting to nature means not only abstracting from 
the I’s subjective structure but also from its contingent perception of the object. The I must abstract 
from all the ways it happens to perceive its object in virtue of the empirical I that it is. In both 
intellectual intuition and Hegel’s Psychology, then, the subject abstracts from the empirically 
contingent features of its subjective experience. For only in thus abstracting can the subject focus 
on what is essential to the object it seeks to know. 
 
3.2 Associative Imagination 
The next stage of intelligence’s development is associative imagination. Here, intelligence 
associates a set of images by grouping them under a universal image, one that exhibits a property 
(or properties) shared by the set. So, I associate several different cakes, cakes with chocolate in 
their ingredients, by subsuming them under a more general representation of chocolate cake. What 
                                               
7 “But though the intellect (Verstand) has in itself the defect just indicated, it is nevertheless a necessary moment of 
rational thinking. Its activity consists, in general, in abstraction. Now if it separates off the contingent from the 
essential it is entirely within its rights and appears as what in truth it ought to be. Therefore, someone who pursues 
an essential purpose is called a man of intellect” (§467 Z). 
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is more, I select the universal representation into which I sort my particular representations. From 
a plurality of potential principles, I generate the one by which I will determine whether certain 
cakes qualify as instances of the same genus. Association is then an advance over reproductive 
imagination in allowing intelligence to organize the images it represents. 
3.2.1 Production 
What does associative imagination have to do with intellectual intuition? Associative 
imagination organizes the mental images intelligence represents; it does not intellectually produce 
what intelligence intuits. Yet there is still a marked discrepancy between the subjectivity of 
intelligence’s mental images and their developmental role in objective thinking. Indeed, Hegel 
alerts us to these images’ developmental role by highlighting their objective character. 
The representation is the middle term in the syllogism of the ascent of intelligence, the link 
between the two meanings of relation-to-self, namely being and universality, which in 
consciousness are determined as object and subject. Intelligence supplements what is found 
with the meaning of universality, and supplements what is its own, the inner, with the 
meaning of being, but a being posited by itself. 
The abstraction that occurs in the representing activity by which universal 
representations are produced etc. (§455 A) 
This passage highlights the objective character of intelligence’s associations in two ways. 
First, intelligence “finds” the representations it categorizes—just as it “finds itself determined” by 
the objects it intuits (§446). To find something is to distinguish what one finds from oneself. So, 
in both intuition and imagination, the fact that intelligence finds something underlines the 
independent existence, the objectivity, of the thing found. The above passage also stresses the 
objective character of associative imagination in describing how intelligence brings its general 
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categories into “being” (a quality Hegel attributes to the object of consciousness) by populating 
these categories with the particular representations they comprehend. Thus, although it is true that 
intelligence produces associations which are merely subjective, it is also true that these 
associations possess object-like independence in both their particular and universal moments. 
Why does Hegel again emphasize the objectivity of intelligence’s imaginings and, in so 
doing, erode the distinction between representation and intuition? Because this erosion is a step 
toward the mind’s reconciliation of representation and intuition at the end of the Psychology. 
Ultimately, intelligence produces the intuitions it thinks and thereby extends to intuition the control 
it exercises over representation. Thus, here too is an evident parallel to intellectual intuition, to a 
mind that produces the objects it intuits. For in objectifying representations the mind moves closer 
to representing objects. 
3.2.2 Abstraction 
We already saw that associative imagination exercises more control over abstraction in its 
ability to represent whatever it wishes as the universal image by which it will associate particular 
images. So, I can represent a large cake to myself and thereby associate cakes as much by their 
bulk as by their chocolate ingredients. Whereas before intelligence was bound to associate objects 
with the time and place in which it intuited them, now intelligence can associate images in 
whatever way it wishes. Part of intelligence’s increasing control over abstraction has to do with 
what intelligence abstracts from, that is, content intelligence has already internalized. Both the 
particular images intelligence abstracts from and the universal images intelligence abstracts to are 
internal to the mind. 
In abstracting from its images, therefore, intelligence also abstracts from itself. At the same 
time, however, the images intelligence abstracts from are internalized from external intuition. 
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Thus, in associative imagination intelligence abstracts from both the empirical content of the 
objects it intuits and from the mental content of the images it represents. Like the mind of 
intellectual intuition that abstracts reciprocally from both itself and its object, the intelligence 
abstracts from both its subjective and objective moments, from its images and its intuitions. 
In Schelling, the mind abstracts reciprocally (as we saw) from subject and object because 
each is correlative of the. And here too, the intelligence’s reciprocal abstraction also indicates a 
correlation between intelligence and its object. At each stage of the Psychology, intelligence and 
its object assume different forms in virtue of how each relates to the other. First, intelligence intuits 
intuitions, then, it imagines representations, then, it remembers names, and finally, it thinks 
thoughts. Thus, in associative imagination, intelligence’s reciprocal abstraction from image and 
intuition acknowledges what the broader structure of Hegel’s Psychology announces—namely, the 
metaphysical correlation between subject and object. In both Schelling and Hegel, then, the 
abstraction that helps unify subject and object in thought also reflects this metaphysical correlation 
between the two. 
 
3.3 Creative Imagination 
In creative imagination, intelligence produces representations it uses to refer to mental 
images. So, instead of picturing a lion I can picture a bushy mane, or the word “lion,” to refer to 
my image of a lion. Creative imagination thus gives me more flexibility in choosing how to 
summon the images I wish to consider. To symbolize something in creative imagination, I need 
only one intuitable aspect of the symbol to relate to the image the symbol represents. I can use a 
mane to symbolize a lion because I associate a mane with lions I have intuited. To signify 
something in creative imagination, no intuitable aspect of the sign need relate to the image the sign 
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represents. No intuitable aspect of the word "lion" need be related to lions I have intuited. Creative 
imagination is then an advance over associative imagination in that intelligence relies less on 
specific intuitions to summon the images it wishes to represent. 
3.3.1 Production 
What does creative imagination have to do with intellectual intuition? Creative imagination 
produces representations that refer to images derived from intuition. Even the created sign, then, 
refers to an image still ultimately conditioned by the subjective intuitions of a particular 
intelligence. What the word “lion” means to me may (given my particular psychological and 
historical circumstances) still be different from what it means to you, even if in most cases we 
agree that the objects we call lions are the same. Thus, the imagination creates something that is 
not genuinely objective in the way the object of intellectual intuition is. Yet by calling our attention 
to the objective qualities of signs and symbols, Hegel nevertheless invokes intellectual intuition as 
the sort of mind into which intelligence develops. 
In fantasy, intelligence has been perfected to self-intuition within itself inasmuch as its 
content, derived from its own self, has pictorial existence. This structure of its self-intuiting 
is subjective; the moment of what is is still lacking. But in the structure's unity of the inner 
content and the material, intelligence has likewise implicitly returned to identical self-
relation as immediacy. As reason, intelligence starts by appropriating what is immediately 
found within itself (§445, c.f. §455 A), i.e. by determining it as a universal; 
correspondingly its activity as reason (§438) is, from the present point on, to determine as 
a being what within it has been perfected to concrete self-intuition, i.e. to make itself into 
being, into the thing. When active in this determination, it is self-externalising, 
intuition-producing: (yy) sign-making fantasy. (§457) 
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The intelligence’s transition from appropriating intuitions to producing intuitions is one of the key 
transitions of the Psychology. And the more this transition proceeds, the more the mind appears to 
move from an intellect that intuits to an intellectual intuition. 
Notice first Hegel’s emphasis on “self-intuition.” Like the I of Schelling which, as we saw, 
intuits itself in the act of its self-positing, the intelligence of the Psychology also intuits itself in 
the act of positing itself. Granted that intelligence does not, like Schelling’s I, intuit itself in a 
reflexive act of self-consciousness. Intelligence does not say “I am” and, in so doing, render itself 
an object for itself. But, intelligence does create content, i.e., images, it identifies with itself. “For 
the content of intelligence is intelligence itself, and so is the determination that it gives to this 
content” (§457 A). In creative imagination, intelligence occupies itself with content that originates 
in itself—content that is of itself, by itself, and for itself. If the latter sounds suspiciously like the 
Gettysburg Address, it is because both address the same momentous issue, namely, self-
determination. 
As I mentioned earlier, self-determination is also at stake in the Psychology. (In fact, self-
determination is at stake in intellectual intuition as well, fundamentally so for Fichte but also for 
Schelling.) Besides explaining how intelligence comes to know its object, Hegel also explains how 
intelligence emancipates itself from objects that determine it. How can I keep my mind from being 
acted on, imposed on, by objects I intuit? Part of Hegel’s solution in the Psychology involves 
making the objects I intuit mine, first by appropriating them, then by creating them, but ultimately, 
by reconciling myself to them. At the culmination of its development, the intelligence reconciles 
subject and object by disclosing their unity. Here, in creative imagination, we approach 
reconciliation by seeing how objective the intelligence can make the images it creates. For in 
making its contents objective the mind can realize its unity with objects. 
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Related to intelligence’s increasing ability to create what it intuits is Hegel’s point about 
the physical intuitability of what intelligence creates. Intelligence is embodied and can use its body 
to express signs. So, intelligence can, for instance, produce utterances to signify its images (§459). 
Here, Hegel invokes language, describing it as “the product of intelligence for manifesting its 
representations in an external element” (§459 A). In passing, Hegel specifically addresses written 
language, “which enlists the help of an externally practical activity” and which “proceeds to the 
field of immediate spatial intuition, in which it takes and produces signs (§454)” (ibid.). As before, 
Hegel merges internal representations and external intuitions, blurring those boundaries Schelling 
thought intellectual intuition transgressed. 
Although the Psychology first presents representations as internalized intuitions, here 
Hegel inverts this presentation (quite willfully) in describing linguistic representations manifested 
“in an external element.” Here, a physical thing intelligence produces, a vocal sound, a semiotic 
mark, is (in keeping with his inversion) “the subjective element which gives itself objectivity in 
the image” (§457 Z). In linguistic signs, the physical object intelligence intuits is subjective while 
the internal image intelligence represents is objective. Hegel reverses his presentation here because 
the sign can only refer to what it is a sign of if intelligence mentally connects the sign to its referent, 
namely, its image. The sign’s only connection to objectivity is, in other words, the image (of the 
object) intelligence associates with it. Nevertheless, Hegel’s description of a subject fabricating 
physical things and mentally conferring objectivity upon them—this too parallels salient themes 
in Schelling’s account of intellectual intuition. 
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3.3.2 Abstraction 
One may object, Westphal in particular, that I overstate the intelligence's ability to create 
what it intuits. After all, anything the intelligence represents intelligence must ultimately derive 
from intuition. What this objection overlooks, however, is Hegel's explicit and principled 
insistence on the intelligence's negation of intuition over the course of the Psychology. In an 
important sense, intelligence must then reconstitute rather than re-present the intuitions it gradually 
eliminates. Hegel is especially adamant on this point in an introductory section of his Psychology 
where he singles out Condillac’s empiricist psychology for criticism. 
In particular the governing principle is that the sensory is taken, no doubt rightly, as 
primary, as the initial foundation, but that from this starting-point the subsequent 
determinations appear as emerging only in an affirmative manner and the negative aspect 
of mind’s activity, by which this material is spiritualized and sublated in its sensoriness, is 
misconceived and overlooked. In this approach, the sensory is not merely what is 
empirically primary, but continues to serve as the genuinely substantial foundation. 
(§442 A) 
I have spoken already about how the intelligence’s negation of intuition mitigates 
Westphal’s attempt to prescind intellectual intuition from Hegel’s Psychology. Here, however, I 
want to connect the theme of negation to the theme of abstraction I have been tracing throughout. 
In reproductive and associative imagination, we can readily see that intelligence negates intuitions 
by abstracting to increasingly universal images of them. I negate the intuitable contents of a 
particular chocolate cake by abstracting to the image of a chocolate cake in general. 
In creative imagination, however, the connection between negation and abstraction is less 
apparent. Clarifying this connection is critical, however, to claiming (as I have) that Hegel’s 
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Psychology draws on Schelling’s intellectual intuition—Schelling’s account of intellectual 
abstraction in particular. How then does creative imagination abstract from intuition? In the first 
phase of creative imagination, the symbol, intelligence may (as we saw) abstract from all but one 
of its image’s intuitable properties. Then, intelligence can make its image’s remaining property the 
basis of that same image’s resemblance to its symbol. So, I can use the color red to symbolize 
embarrassment because of the flush that often accompanies our feeling embarrassed. How does 
abstraction stand with respect to the sign, the second phase of creative imagination? In the sign, I 
may abstract from all the intuitable properties of my image, except, the property of intuitability 
itself. I can then use an intuition that, sheer intuitability aside, bears no resemblance to the image 
it signifies. Thus, in creative imagination too abstraction helps emancipate the mind from intuition, 
much as it helps the mind transcend subjectivity in Schelling’s intellectual intuition of nature. 
 
3.4 Mechanical Memory 
3.4.1 Production 
The Psychology’s treatment of memory and mechanical memory, in particular, contains 
some of Hegel’s clearest statements on the connection between his ideas and Schelling’s. In 
memory, the mind of Hegel’s Psychology “has ceased to deal with an image derived from 
intuition—the immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an object 
which is the product of intelligence itself—such a without-book as remains locked up in the within-
book of intelligence, and is, within intelligence, only its outward and existing side” (§462). 
Hegel characterizes the object (Dasein) the intelligence is “dealing with” as “the product 
of intelligence itself,” echoing both Kantian and Schellingian conceptions of intellectual intuition.8 
                                               
8 Admittedly, “Dasein” is not a word Hegel typically uses to mean object. In the Science of Logic, “Dasein” represents 
the third stage in Hegel's Doctrine of Being. At this stage, Being and Nothing sublate each other in the whole they 
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Moreover, this object intelligence produces is produced without being “derived from intuition.” 
This sort of object is what Hegel calls a name. A name encapsulates the content of a thought but 
is “free,” as Jere Surber puts it, “of any sensual, imagistic, or representational component” (257). 
Take Hegel’s lion example. In thinking about a lion “we need neither the actual vision of the 
animal, nor its image even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple 
representation. We think in names” (§462 A). 
With the name, the mind may discard the images initially essential to its cognition. Hegel 
has several ways of describing this progressive excision of imagistic material, a process which 
culminates in mechanical memory and the intelligence’s loss of all meaningful content. In §463, 
the mind engages in “the supreme self-divestment of intelligence,” and in the Zusatz to §462, 
words are described as “something bereft of mind.” The names the mind entertains are so empty 
of what it has entertained previously—images, representations, what was until now the currency 
of thought—that names confront the mind as something other than, or external to, thought. This 
emptied alterity existing within the mind is what Hegel ultimately honors with the term 
“objectivity” (Objektivität). The name is an object for the subject because the subject regards the 
name as other than it. However, the name is also something generated by the mind and immanent 
to it. In the passage describing reproductive memory, Hegel alludes to the peculiarity of this 
situation in which the “without-book . . . remains locked up in the within-book of intelligence.” 
Later, Hegel writes: 
In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and with the thing it has 
the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as giving an existence to the content 
                                               
mutually condition; Being and Nothing develop into Becoming, or "Dasein.” Thus, M.J. Petry’s (1977) translation, 
“determinate being,” may be more accurate than W. Wallace’s (Hegel 1971, 203) gloss. See Jere O’Neill Surber (2011, 
243-61). See also Michael Inwood (2003) on “determinate being.” 
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in intelligence, is the externality of intelligence to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection 
of the name, i.e., of an intuition of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-
externalization to which intelligence reduces itself on its own ground. (§462)  
The mind must, to think anything, express its thoughts in some existent form 
distinguishable from itself. The name is the “existence” with which the mind furnishes its thoughts. 
But the name is also, as Hegel stresses, “the self-externalization to which intelligence reduces itself 
on its own ground.” One might think Hegel is simply restating his first point from a different 
vantage, that the mind distinguishes itself from the name it thinks about by being as “external” to 
the name as the name is to it. But Hegel already alluded to the distinction mind makes between 
itself and the thought it expresses, its name. Before the colon in the above passage, there is the 
phrase: “the externality of intelligence to itself.” So, what does Hegel add with “self-
externalization”? 
The answer lies in the “inwardization or recollection” the name undergoes. The name does 
not require inwardization in the way an outer intuition does, because the name is generated by and 
proper to the mind. It may seem strange to think that a word like “lion” is proper to the mind. 
Surely “lion” has an externally intuitable form, a standard combination of auditory features that 
distinguishes it from other sounds. Indeed, Hegel made much in sign-creation of the sign’s physical 
embodiment in the “vocal note.” So in what sense is the name already inward? In the transition 
from imagination to memory Hegel writes that “The reduction of” the name’s “outwardness to 
inwardness is (verbal) Memory” (§460). In memory, the name is the word “lion” that we retain in 
our minds, not the auditory instantiation of the word, but the word as thought. One might object 
that, even in thought, we hear the word lion when we think of it. But we do not hear a word we 
recollect. Our inner monologue is silent. 
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By inwardization, Hegel means a name’s capacity to encapsulate a thought “apart from 
intuition and image.” When we know and understand the name “lion” we “recollect” what a lion 
is, without associating the name “lion” with intuitable data. In being known by us, the object is 
“in” us and thus “inwardized.” When the mind knows a thing solely through its name, “apart from 
image or intuition,” this amounts to a reduction of the mind “on its own ground.” For in eliminating 
the intuitable image, the mind is left only with something other than or “external” to it. 
Here, the correspondence between intuition and subjectivity is again apparent. Before 
deploying names, the mind represented things in intuitable images, and to this extent, consisted of 
the intuitions it represented. Intuitions were definitive of the mind’s subjectivity, structurally 
essential to how it thought about and encountered objects. For the mind to now think differently, 
for it to think in names rather than intuitions, it must conceive of itself as other than what it has 
been, as external to itself. The mind is not the kind of subject it once was.9  
The Hegelian account of memory just given bears clear parallels to Schellingian 
intellectual intuition. The Hegelian name is an object produced by the mind; the mind produces 
the object by abstracting from intuition; and the object, while distinct from the mind, is also 
immanent to it. We have in the name, what Hegel calls an “object” produced by the mind. The 
mind arrives at this object, the name, by abstracting from intuition, which Hegel regards as 
fundamental to the structure of subjectivity. Further, we have seen something the mind only sees 
at the conclusion of mechanical memory, that the “object,” despite being distinguished from the 
mind in its mindlessness, is at the same time immanent to the mind. 
                                               
9 The word “Entäusserung” that Wallace and Petry translate as “self-externality” can also mean “self-alienation,” 
suggesting the way intelligence has produced something alien to itself. The mind is a subject that is other than itself 
within itself, or, external to itself within itself. 
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In mechanical memory, the mind runs through a series of names without noticing what 
these names refer to. Hegel cites rote memorization as an example. A person can more readily 
memorize a composition if he “attaches no meaning to its words” (§463). In mechanical memory, 
the mind is so used to naming its representations, and to thinking of its representations in names, 
that it no longer discerns the meanings behind the names it thinks.  The mental self-divestment 
observed in the mind’s use of names has now been taken a step further. The mind regards names 
as not only empty of imagistic form but of any meaningful content whatever. Hegel describes the 
names of mechanical memory as “meaningless words,” for instance, and later writes: 
The faculty of conning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their 
succession, or which are separately meaningless . . . is so supremely marvellous, because 
it is the very essence of mind to have its wits about it; whereas in this case the mind is 
estranged in itself, and its action is like machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity 
with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it 
has in intuition been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made . . . it proceeds as 
memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of 
something found. Thus, one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here 
put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. (§463 A) 
The mind regards names as non-mental, as “found” by the mind rather than proper to it 
because names no longer encapsulate anything meaningful. The mind eliminated so much of what 
characteristically constituted itself, that what remains is regarded as other than itself. Language 
similar to Hegel’s earlier discussion of self-externalization resurfaces accordingly: “the mind is 
estranged in itself,” “make[s] itself external in itself.” Two points, however, are newly of note in 
this passage. First, Hegel describes the mind as embodying properties of its purportedly non-
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mental contents, that is, its names. The mind of mechanical memory does not “have its wits about 
it.” It functions with blind automaticity. This talk suggests that the mind has made itself into an 
object of sorts. Hegel writes in the Anmerkung to §457 that the mind “makes itself be as a thing,” 
and later in the Zusatz to §462, the mind takes “on the nature of a thing and to such a degree that 
subjectivity, in its distinction from the thing, becomes quite empty, a mindless container of words, 
that is a mechanical memory.” 
Thus, mechanical memory follows a trajectory similar to Schelling’s intellectual intuition 
of nature. For in Schelling too, the I constitutes both its self and its object (A). Likewise, in 
Schelling, the subject’s ability to render itself objective is key to attaining objective knowledge. 
As Schelling writes, “[T]o make the subject-object [as the object of intellectual intuition] objective 
and to bring it out of itself to the point where it wholly coincides with nature.” Note how similar 
Schelling’s process looks to Hegel’s where, in mechanical memory, the mind “makes itself be as 
a thing.” Note also that, as in Schelling, mechanical memory’s objectification of itself is important 
for its acquisition of objective knowledge. “[O]ne of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. 
objectivity, is,” as Hegel writes, “here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it.” This mention of 
“objectivity” in thought establishes the developmental narrative of the Psychology as also being 
about the acquisition of knowledge, knowledge similar to that gained in Schelling’s intellectual 
intuition. 
At its culmination, mechanical memory transitions to what Hegel calls thinking. Thinking 
is Hegel’s term for the objective knowledge acquired at the end of Theoretical Mind, and 
importantly for our comparison to Schelling, this objective knowledge realizes the essential 
identity of subject and object (C). Hegel writes of this identity as follows: 
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If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent requires something 
else—to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical 
memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivity and the meaning. In this way 
intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such 
an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the 
function of thought, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed 
from the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existence. (§464) 
It may seem curious for Hegel to speak of the intelligence as interpreting the names it thinks 
in if these names are meaningless. However, Hegel explains what interpretation he has in mind 
earlier when he writes in §463 that the intelligence, besides having names within it, is “at the same 
time the power over the different names—the link which, having nothing in itself, fixes in itself 
series of them and keeps them in stable order.” The mind is not only the names it traffics in. It is 
also the organizing activity that holds these names together. On Houlgate’s reading, the mind 
becomes aware of itself as “the purely abstract, mechanical activity of connecting alone” (90). If 
before the mind equated itself with its representations, made “itself be as a thing,” now the mind 
equates itself with the unifying activity that renders these things its own. 
But how does the intelligence come to realize it is not merely the thing organized but also 
the organizer? Intelligence recognizes itself as this organizing activity because it has stripped away 
its intuitable content. The intelligence, having at the culmination of its self-divestments abstracted 
completely from its representations, realizes the degree to which it is utterly abstract, “a merely 
abstract subjectivity” as Hegel calls it. This mental abstraction and the self-knowledge that results 
also reveals the essential identity of the intelligence and its objects (its names), an identity that 
results in objective knowledge. Here too, a point of contact with Schelling emerges in that the 
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mind’s abstraction from the subjectivity of its representations makes acquiring objective 
knowledge possible.  
To return to our passage above, the “representing intellect,” again, interprets the “mere 
names” insofar as it holds them in an ordered sequence. But we now have the other “of the two 
dynamic factors of thought,” namely, an apperceptive subjectivity (§463 A). Hegel alludes to this 
when he writes above that “in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external 
objectivity and the meaning.” The external objectivity of the intelligence is its names, and the 
meaning of the intelligence is the “stable order” it confers upon them.10 Thus, “[i]n this way” as 
Hegel writes “intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity.”  
This unity of objectivity and meaning amounts to the realization of subject-object unity 
essential to objective thought. “[I]ntelligence is explicitly,” as Hegel makes clear “a plain 
identity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that what is, only is in 
so far as it is a thought (§§ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its 
content and object” (§465). Here, at the opening of Hegel’s section on thinking, is another 
evocation of Schelling’ mind thinking that object. Moreover, the identity of the subjective and 
objective is something the intelligence realizes. Thus, I close my discussion of mechanical 
memory with the contention that, given the thematic and terminological parallels between 
mechanical memory and Schelling’s intellectual intuition of nature, we must conclude that Hegel 
wrote this section with Schelling in mind. In speaking of an intelligence that abstracts from itself 
and thereby realizes the knowledge it has of the objects it produces, Hegel also speaks of 
Schelling’s intellectual intuition. 
 
                                               
10 The names themselves are externally objective because, as above, they are meaningless, and in this respect alien to 
the essential functioning of the mind. 
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3.5 Addressing an Objection: Why Here? Why Now? 
I am not alone in thinking intellectual intuition plays a role in Hegel’s mature philosophy. 
Indeed, various proponents of this view have pointed to various places in Hegel’s oeuvre where 
they believe something like Schelling’s intellectual intuition to be in evidence. Thus, the 
objection—that Hegel’s debt to intellectual intuition ought to be apparent in several of his mature 
works and not merely in one section of one mature work—can be avoided by relying on the 
existing literature.11 
The more specific objection, however, regarding what motivates Hegel’s appeal to 
intellectual intuition here in the Psychology—this cannot be avoided. For, if he had no reason for 
incorporating intellectual intuition at this stage of his system, then Hegel’s appeal to Schelling is 
arbitrary. Indeed, arbitrary enough to call the appeal itself into question. Better, in this case, to 
ignore the text’s apparent parallels to Schelling than to insist, absurdly, that Hegel appeals to 
Schelling at random. 
But Hegel’s introduction of intellectual intuition at this juncture is not random. On the 
contrary, here Hegel confronts a distinctive set of philosophical problems very like the ones 
Schelling confronted before him. These problems, which Schelling called on intellectual intuition 
to solve, motivate Hegel’s appeal to his former master’s methods. In short, Hegel aligns with 
Schelling at this moment because both face off against a common problem. 
                                               
11 See, for instance, Franks (2005, 378-9). Franks cites 3:520 of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Hegel 
1955, Translated by Haldane and Simson). Or, see Kreines (2007, 306-334). Kreines cites introductory sections of the 
Encyclopedia Logic (Hegel 1991, Translated by Geraets, Harris, and Suchting). Or, see McCumber (2014). McCumber 
cites the Psychology section of the Encyclopedia as I do. There, Hegel’s account of mechanical memory features what 
McCumber calls a “linguisticized intellectual intuition,” wherein “philosophical thought ‘externalizes’ itself into 
names” and thereby “creates its own objects, which like the sounds of words are intuitive in nature” (2014, 71). 
McCumber, however, is wrong to characterize this intellectual intuition as linguistic, since it is principally Schelling’s 
intellectual intuition of nature that Hegel has in mind.  
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As evidence of this common problem, consider how both philosophers describe the task 
before them. In his essay “On the True Concept of the Philosophy of Nature,” Schelling grapples 
with how we can have objective knowledge. Indeed, Schelling clarifies what he means by 
“objective,” in part to explain how such knowledge is attainable. The “objective” for Schelling 
refers to our knowledge of the structure of reality, where reality consists in a unity of the subjective 
and objective. Although we traditionally see objects as cut off from subjects and for this reason 
regard objectivity as an unlikely epistemic extravagance, for Schelling, the “objective” is the 
essential unity of subject and object when grasped by consciousness. Objectivity is a feat of 
“consciousness in which the subjective raises itself to the highest (theoretical) potency” (92). In 
other words, consciousness here reaches a level of development wherein it apprehends the 
essentially unified structure of reality. Hence Schelling’s concern with the status of mental 
activities like “sensation, intuition etc.” which, as he stipulates (more than once), are only 
practicable for this objective mind, this mind aware of reality as unified (92, 96).  
Schelling’s description of objectivity as the pinnacle of conscious activity underlines the 
cognitive character of the problem he confronts which, in sum, is the mind’s alleged inability to 
grasp something unlike itself, i.e., nature. Hegel too grapples with the mind’s attempt to know 
(veridically) the world it inhabits. Hence Hegel’s parallel preoccupation with cognition and its 
relationship to truth. 
The operation of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition, though not in 
the sense that intelligence cognises among other things but in addition also intuits, represents, 
recollects, imagines, etc. Such a position is . . . connected with the great question of recent times, 
whether genuine cognising, i.e. cognition of truth, is possible, with the implication that, if we see 
that it is not possible, we have to abandon this endeavor (§445 A). 
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Both Hegel and Schelling, then, depart from a similar starting point: the human mind and 
its uncertain endeavor to understand the world. Given this shared point of origin, it is hardly 
surprising that Hegel appeals—precisely at this moment—to Schelling’s past teachings, even if he 
does so more in the spirit of revision than regurgitation. 
Beyond sharing a common problem, Hegel and Schelling also share an intuition about how 
this problem can be solved. Both emphasize the emergence of our mind from the world it seeks to 
understand and by implication point to the merely immanent difference between mind and world. 
For, in being only immanently different from us, the world is plausibly intelligible to us. Thus, 
Schelling and Hegel both suspect that the mind-world problem is solvable insofar as the mind itself 
is a part of the world it seeks to understand. 
Schelling therefore emphasizes the mind’s origin in nature, a proposition which, when 
properly understood, will reveal nature to “no longer be a dead, merely extended whole, but rather 
a living whole which increasingly reveals the spirit incarnated in it and which, by means of the 
highest spiritualisation, will in the end return into itself and complete itself” (104-5). This “spirit” 
which Schelling describes as “incarnated” in nature develops into a mind that knows nature, a 
mind which, in this knowledge, is implicated in nature once more. 
In his introductory sections to the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel also stresses the mind’s 
emergence from nature and does so for systematic reasons. Hegel treats the subjects discussed in 
the Encyclopedia according to the logical order of their development. So, in the Philosophy of 
Nature, for instance, organics is treated after inorganics because organics emerges dialectically 
from inorganics. Organic life emerges from inorganic matter and not the other way around. By the 
same token, in the Philosophy of Mind, the mind develops out of nature. “[M]ind” as Hegel writes, 
“has nature as its presupposition” (§381). 
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Thus, the Philosophy of Mind is the first time in the Encyclopedia where Hegel deals with 
the individual minds of living organisms. Hegel is not here discussing the development of the 
logical idea or the emergence of nature out of the logical idea. He is rather discussing cognition as 
it comes about in self-conscious animals, that is, in humans. The Zusatz to §381 elaborates on this 
point, laying out the ground Hegel has covered to arrive at mind’s emergence. “Philosophy has to 
demonstrate the necessity of this concept [viz. mind], as of all its other concepts, which means that 
philosophy has to cognize it as the result of the development of the universal concept or the logical 
Idea. But in this development, the mind is preceded not only by the logical Idea but also by external 
nature.” 
Thus, Schelling and Hegel again converge, not, this time, in the problem they share, but in 
the solution, they perceive to be implicit therein. For in Hegel, too, the mind that emerges from 
nature (as soul) returns to nature (as intelligence). First, the mind, as a product of nature, is viewed 
“in its immediate unity with nature” (381 Z). Then, later in its development, the mind is defined 
“in its opposition to nature” (ibid.). Finally, however, the mind resumes “its unity with nature” and 
thereby “returns to itself out of that [former] opposition” (ibid.). Like Schelling’s consciousness 
which “return[s] into itself and complete[s] itself,” the mind of the Encyclopedia reconciles itself 
to its natural origins through knowledge of these origins. Indeed, as in Schelling, the mind may 
come to know nature because it is part and parcel of it. 
To conclude, Hegel likely appealed to intellectual intuition in the Psychology because he 
recognized an ally in Schelling, one whose methods were at once intimately familiar and singularly 
suited to the task at hand. The mind’s cognition of the world may appear to be too broad and ill-
defined an issue to establish something like philosophical influence. However, as I have tried to 
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show, Schelling and Hegel had highly specific and strikingly similar ways of framing this issue, 
both with respect to what this issue was and how they might overcome it. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
I have tried to establish a point of contact between Schelling and the mature Hegel. That 
Hegel broke with Schelling to establish his dialectical method of philosophy does not rule out the 
possibility that Hegel continued to draw on Schelling’s ideas and lexicon. Given the prominence 
of certain Schellingian themes in Hegel’s Psychology, it would be rash to infer that Hegel 
altogether abandoned the idea of an intellectual intuition of nature. Indeed, that the mind of Hegel’s 
Psychology produces something it regards as objective, that the mind is brought closer in its 
apprehension of objectivity by abstracting from itself, and finally, that the objective knowledge 
the mind apprehends reveals the identity of subject and object—these are among the tenets of 
Schelling’s account of intellectual intuition. And it is this account—of an intellectual intuition of 
nature—which loomed large in Hegel’s memory even after he had left Jena for Berlin.  
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